1967. This was also a time of contrasting views with respect to America's involvement in the Vietnam War. On the one hand, the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV) was reporting significant progress in the prosecution of the war, and the end appeared to be in sight.
On the other hand, troop levels were approaching nearly 500,000 in late 1967 and nationwide protests of the draft were gaining public momentum and support while American casualties were increasing daily. Intense debates ensued in Congress and within the administration over ground strategy, pacification, and bombing. 3 Although America was being told that the United
States was on track for a victory in Vietnam, secretly, General Westmoreland was requesting additional troops with the appearance of an open-ended escalation. President Johnson was clearly concerned about his declining approval rating, which dipped below 38% in October 1967. 4 Behind the scenes, President Johnson was pressing General Westmoreland and
Secretary of Defense McNamara for a new military and public relation's strategy in order to garner waning support. General Westmoreland and his public affairs officers developed a strategy to convince the American public that the allies were making progress in the war.
Despite the negative media portrayal of the South Vietnamese as incompetent and ineffective,
MACV volleyed back with positive reports of improvement and battlefield successes by the
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). 5 Westmoreland's public relations strategy was not working and the president was growing increasingly impatient as his public support increasingly headed south. President Johnson insisted that General Westmoreland travel to Washington and engage on the diplomatic circuit in an attempt to win back public support for the war. 6 In what was considered an unprecedented event in military history, General Westmoreland delivered a passionate speech, on behalf of the President, to a joint session of Congress in April 1967. General Westmoreland declared "if backed at home by resolve, confidence, patience, determination, and continued support, we will prevail in Vietnam over the Communist aggressor!" McCarthy stated, "I have grave reservations about using a field commander on active duty as an instrument to make a case which is not only military but also political." 8 Despite the initial success of Westmoreland's speech, the President continued to receive media criticism for escalating the war which accounted for nearly 500,000 men in late 1967. 9 The unpopularity of the Vietnam War coupled with the slow evaporation of the President's domestic programs for a "Great Society" was beginning to take a physical and mental toll on the According to those who knew Johnson best, he resented the fact that he was not nominated for the Democratic Presidential ticket for which he had to settle for the number two position. "This situation put him in a disagreeable position of working for a younger man to whom he felt intellectually and socially inferior. Analysts at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in Washington, D.C., assembled a joint paper predicting that the NVA's main attack was not Khe Sanh, but rather a feint for a larger scale offensive:
Among the more experienced Vietnam analysts, the DIA people had spent four years studying NVA methods and they based their conclusions on the understanding of Giap's techniques. The paper outlined the NVA alternative purpose: to draw American forces away from the coastal plain. When the analysts presented their paper at a DIA briefing, the audience was amused and listeners laughed when the analysts suggested that the Joint Chiefs be appraised of the analysis and that it be sent to Saigon as a DIA assessment. Their boss, an Army colonel, remarked, "How could you possibly know more than General Westmoreland?" 21 Westmoreland increasingly became more obsessed with Khe Sanh. He was convinced that Khe Sanh was the main effort. He led others, to include most intelligence sources, the JCS, and the White House, to the same conclusion. He was also convinced that this battle could be the defining moment in his military career as well as be the turning point for the Vietnam War. 22 As the senior operational commander, he went to great lengths in providing the necessary support to the Marines at Khe Sanh. He became personally involved in the buildup of the airbase and surrounding terrain which included overseeing improvements to the runway, installation of ground and air intelligence sensors, and reinforcements of artillery. 23 Sanh for a firsthand appraisal of the situation there." 34 Davidson was shocked at the lack of preparation by Colonel Lownds and the 26 th Marine Regiment at the airbase. The airbase was not protected with sandbags and was literally exposed to enemy artillery and mortar fires. 35 Colonel Lownds even went so far as to disagree with Colonel Davidson on the size and capability of the approaching NVA divisions:
Davidson was equally shocked when he talked with Colonel David Lownds. In spite of what MACV considered overwhelming evidence that two, three, or possibly even four NVA divisions were closing in on the base, Lownds refused to believe it. The Colonel told Davidson that he was certain that there was an enemy regiment out there in the hills beyond the Marine wire, but that was all he was certain of. Davidson spent the next thirty minutes trying to convince Lownds of the accuracy of MACV's intelligence reports, but the Colonel remained skeptical. 36 Westmoreland was not amused over this lack of focus and began to question the competence of the Marine command in I Corps. Westmoreland dispatched his deputy, General
Creighton Abrams, to visit Khe Sanh and make his own assessment. Abrams verified the lack of readiness and unity of effort and wanted to relieve Colonel Lownds on the spot, but
Westmoreland overruled him. 37 Westmoreland instead directed that General Abrams position himself in the I Corps sector and stand up and assume the MACV forward headquarters, as commander of all forces in the northern province. 47 According to Westmoreland, it was good for his staff to hear the worst, but he sternly followed up with the following remarks; "We are not, repeat not, going to be defeated at Khe Sanh," and with that he marched out of the room to drive his point home. 48 As the intense shelling with views of hunkered down Marines played out on the nightly news, the media were insatiable about characterizing Khe Sanh as another Dien Bien Phu.
Johnson was clearly being swayed by the media. As late as February 1968, Pentagon and White House briefers were jumping on the bandwagon and comparing the similarities of the two battles. Although the press may get its unfair share of blame for the mischaracterization, they are quick to point out that others shared in this responsibility:
Although the siege of Khe Sanh never evolved into a major enemy ground assault, it still proved irresistible to the American news media. Westmoreland's statements suggesting the imminence of an enemy offensive in the northern portion of South Vietnam were in part responsible. So was the Johnson Administration's obvious concern, relayed to the press through leaks as well as official statements that the battle might somehow evolve into a debacle. Featuring 6,000 U.S. troops surrounded and under fire, it possessed just the sort of action and drama editors and reporters had always deemed attractive to American audiences. There is a considerable amount of discussion around town about the Khe Sanh situation to include the inevitable comparisons with Dien Bien Phu. One question raised recently in this connection (and I believe it received some consideration at the time of the Dien Bien Phu siege) is whether tactical nuclear weapons should be used if the situation in Khe Sanh should become that desperate. I consider such an eventuality unlikely. Nevertheless, I would appreciate your views as to whether there are targets in the area which lend themselves to nuclear strikes, whether some contingency nuclear planning would be in order, and what you would consider to be some of the more significant pros and cons of using tac nukes in such a contingency. 50 Westmoreland thought it was prudent that the nuclear option be addressed and he
directed a secret group to analyze and make recommendations for this possibility. For fear of word getting out in Washington, President Johnson told Westmoreland to desist. 51 As the situation continued to intensify, Johnson began to have serious misgivings about backing
Westmoreland's decision to hold the base. 52 Johnson became more excited when on the night of 7 February 1968, the NVA attacked the American Special Forces Camp at Lang Vei. This attack was significant psychologically because of the NVA's use of tanks for the first time in the war and further propelled Washington's concern for the siege at Khe Sanh. Much of the attention of press, my own command, and Washington officials understandably focused on Khe Sanh. Khe Sanh was isolated enough and bore enough similarities to Dein Bien Phu to excite arm chair strategists. President Johnson, I learned later, had begun to develop a fixation about it. General Taylor had to set up a special White House Situation Room to depict and analyze American and enemy dispositions and terrain model. The President was clearly in the tactical details at Khe Sanh. In his biography, Johnson talks about how dreams of Dien Bien Phu haunted him at night. He would jump out of bed and in his bathrobe and rush down to the White House Situation Room for hourly updates where he studied aerial photographs, intelligence, friendly and enemy troop movements. 58 The situation was not improving and Johnson directed Westmoreland to hold daily press conferences, but
was vague in what Westmoreland should say. 59 These daily press conferences were cursory at best and did nothing to improve the President's approval rating. With declining popularity numbers, the President was getting desperate. In what is considered to be the most unusual request of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Johnson insisted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff sign a formal declaration of faith in Westmoreland's ability to hold Khe Sanh. 60 Johnson was emphatic about his intent to the Chairman: "I don't want any damn Dinbinphoo." forces were not well prepared. As the recital of enemy capabilities went on, President Johnson turned to Secretary Rusk. "Dean, should we have more than the Tonkin Gulf resolution in going into this? Should we ask for a declaration of war?" Rusk had no desire to get into that subject.
But clearly, the President was getting desperate with Khe Sanh. 68 In probably one of the most telling parts of this meeting on February 9 was Johnson's last statement to his staff and the JCS: "Let's hope for the best, but expect the worst." 69 All of these questions the President was asking were in effect strategic communications between the JCS and General Westmoreland.
There certainly was confusion in the President's statement. Did he mean expect the worst at Khe Sanh, or did he mean expect additional troop requests for the fight?
On 10 February 1968, during a meeting at the senior foreign advisery council at the White House, the President was concerned again that things were not getting better at Khe Sanh and that all of his military advisers kept reassuring him that they could hold and defend Khe Sanh to which the President replied: "All I'm asking is that we make sure that everything has been done. Wheeler the same day, changed his request. 71 The two cables, which arrived at the same time,
were confusing to Johnson as Westmoreland appeared indecisive.
Miscalculated Military Strategy
Westmoreland's obsession with defeating Giap's second Dien Bien Phu at Khe Sanh forced the JCS and the White House to focus on a miscalculated main effort. General Giap insisted that Khe Sanh was never strategically important, but rather its importance was drawn 74 The results of the battle were mixed. The failure of the United States to respond to the attack with an invasion of North Vietnam gave the green light for the TET Offensive to go ahead, but the successful defense of the base forestalled the planned NVA cross-border invasion that was to follow. 75 Westmoreland was highly criticized by those in the press and in Washington. In a detailed memo from the President to General Westmoreland, the President wrote:
There is some irresponsible talk in the newspapers abroad and here today that we have lost confidence in you. I wish to tell you in the bluntest and most direct way that I can that I have never dealt with a man in whom I had more confidence. There is no debate that NVA losses at Khe Sanh were considerable; however, debate continues today whether Khe Sanh was a stalemate or a tactical victory. There was tremendous public and administrative pressure on Westmoreland before, during, and after the siege of Khe Sanh. Whether or not General Giap's intent for Khe Sanh was a feint or not,
Westmoreland clearly envisioned Khe Sanh as the main effort and applied any and all of his military assets at the defense of Khe Sanh. In doing so, he created vulnerabilities in the country's defense thus enabling the successful and undetected invasion from the west during the TET Offensive. Hanoi's intentions were misinterpreted by many, to include MACV's intelligence staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and most importantly, the White House. 79 The political, public, and military obsession with Khe Sanh's comparison to Dien Bien Phu was a distraction that played right into the hands of the enemy. He was able to capitalize on a siege in a remote section of Vietnam and exploit our weakness to win at all costs while missing the blinding obvious of TET.
In the end, Khe Sanh, TET, and the ever increasing protestation of the war in Vietnam 
